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A review of sexual harassment case law was presented
at the 2007 Labor and Employment Roundtable at the
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration. The
foremost lesson is that employers should take steps to
prevent harassment, but failing that, an employer should
maintain and follow a strong policy on sexual harass-
ment and immediately make an effective response to a
complaint.
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Summary
This year’s Labor and Employment Roundtable
reviewed recent developments in labor law. Looking at
the difficulties faced by employers whose employees
allege sexual harassment in the workplace, the round-
table participants concluded that the key is for
employers to respond promptly and effectively to
sexual harassment claims. It is also important to main-
tain a strong policy on harassment. Many claims are
settled through negotiations rather than in court. When
a case does go to a judge, courts in various jurisdictions
have made their own interpretation of the existing case
law, creating a sometimes challenging environment for
employers (and also for those making a complaint).
However, the attorneys reported that when a case goes
before a jury, an employer is better off if it has offered
training in avoiding sexual harassment and has pro-
vided toll-free reporting lines. In the end, the best pol-
icy is to prevent harassment before it occurs by creating
an atmosphere where harassment is not tolerated and
brings swift and sure consequences.
On May 18, 2007, the Center for Hospitality Research
at Cornell University’s School of Hotel Administration
held its seventh annual Labor and Employment Law
Roundtable. As in the past, the participants included
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private practice lawyers, labor and employ-
ment law faculty from a number of different
colleges and law schools, and in-house coun-
sel and human resources executives from
hospitality companies. The participants dis-
cussed four topics at this year’s roundtable:
(1) sexual harassment; (2) the state of
employee retaliation one year after the
Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White decision;
(3) the results of the hotel industries’ 2006
union negotiations; and (4) an update on the
Restatement of Employment Law, a treatise
authored by two roundtable participants. The
purpose of this article is to examine the first
topic, sexual harassment, by discussing the
law, revealing preliminary results of new
research, identifying dilemmas that employ-
ers face, and relaying the consensus of the
roundtable participants.
Sexual Harassment Nine Years
after Ellerth and Faragher
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court issued
two decisions that defined employer lia-
bility in workplace sexual harassment
cases. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton1
and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,2
the Supreme Court held that employers are
liable for their supervisors’ sexual harass-
ment if the harassment resulted in a tangible
loss to the employee (e.g., termination,
demotion). In this instance, employers have
no defense. Employers can also be liable
when there is no tangible loss. In this situa-
tion, however, they can escape liability if they
satisfy a two-prong affirmative defense. To
avoid liability, employers must prove that 
(1) the employer “exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior” and (2) the plaintiff
“unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.”3
As is often the case, commentators
reacted swiftly and intensely to the new
affirmative defense, with the word unrea-
sonable being a key point. Management-
side lawyers and commentators opined that
to satisfy the first prong of the defense,
employers would have to (1) train all
employees and (2) create a toll-free “dis-
crimination hotline.” The commentators
also predicted that employers would be
unlikely to prevail when they seek a sum-
mary judgment because (1) employees
who did not report would argue that such a
failure was reasonable based on the cir-
cumstances and that the court would let
juries decide such issues, and (2) employ-
ees who did report could not be, by defin-
ition, unreasonable.
Eighteen months after the Ellerth and
Faragher decisions, three participants in the
center’s 2001 roundtable, Cornell Law
School Professor Michael Heise, MIT Ph.D.
candidate Zev Eigen, and I, conducted a
study of the first seventy-two summary
judgment motions in which a court based its
decision on the new affirmative defense.
The results, published five years ago in 
the Fordham Law Review, ran counter to the
conventional wisdom, as espoused by the
early commentators (Sherwyn, Heise, and
Eigen 2001). First, employers did not need
to train employees or have a toll-free
number to satisfy the reasonable-care stan-
dard. Instead, every court to analyze the new
defense found that promulgating a “good
policy” constituted reasonable care. A
sexual harassment policy was considered
“good” if it was written, disseminated to all
employees, and did not require the employee
to report harassment to the harassing super-
visor. Second, employees who failed to
report were found to be “unreasonable” if
the company had a good policy. In fact, in
situations where the employers “exercised
reasonable care” and the employee failed to
1. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
2. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
3. Id. at 745.
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report, we found that employers prevailed in
all thirty-one cases. Third, employers pre-
vailed even when the employee did report in
twenty-six out of thirty-one cases. In fact,
the data showed that courts found reporting
employees unreasonable if the employer
responded well.
Still, because employers were best off if
the employee did not report at all, our
tongue-in-cheek conclusion was simple:
exercise reasonable care, but not too much.
The reason for this conclusion was that
employers who exercised reasonable care
and made it too easy to report harassment
could lose if the employee did, in fact,
report (for instance, maintaining a toll-free
line makes reporting eminently easy).
Conversely, employers who had a policy,
but did not train or have a toll-free line
would limit the number of reports and,
thus, increase their chances of prevailing.
We therefore titled our article: “Don’t
Train Your Employees and Cancel Your 1-
800 Discrimination Hotline.”
Despite the title, our main conclusion,
was not, of course, that employers should
skip training employees and supervisors
regarding sexual harassment. Instead, we
argued that the law was problematic because
employers with good HR practices aimed
at eliminating harassment in the workplace
could be in a worse position than those
employers who did the bare minimum.
Consequently, we advocated for a change in
the law. Specifically, we argued for a new
standard that required employers to exercise
reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassment, but without a requirement that
the employee had to unreasonably fail to
take advantage of the employer-provided
services.
We based our conclusion on several fac-
tors. First, our analysis found that regard-
less of the law, variables associated with
employers’ actions affected court deci-
sions, while those stemming from employ-
ees’ actions did not. Second, the question
of when an employees’ actions were con-
sidered unreasonable was unwieldy and
difficult. Was reporting two weeks after an
occurrence unreasonable? How about two
months? Six months? Six years? Where
should courts draw the line? The cases
yielded no clear consensus, and employers
and employees alike were, therefore, operat-
ing in a world of uncertainty. Next, we did
not see the point of examining employer
behavior. We did not see why an employer
who did all it could to prevent harassment
and who responded to a complaint well
should have its liability determined by
whether a report was, for example, timely
or tardy. Moreover, along these same lines,
it seemed that such a ruling provided a
perverse incentive for employers to make
the reporting system cumbersome enough
to subtly discourage or confuse employ-
ees. Finally, it seemed that the key to the
law was to prevent harm, rather than to
judge employees who have been harassed.
We opined that even an employee who
waits years to report harassment should be
compensated if the employer fails to prop-
erly respond. But that same employee
should not prevail if the employer does
respond well.
When we presented this study at the 2001
roundtable, Joe Baumgarten, of Proskauer
Rose, accepted our conclusions but stated
that he would like us to repeat the study in
five years to see whether courts had changed
the standards. Joe agreed with our analy-
sis but believed that courts would soon
require employers to do more than have a
“good policy.” Furthermore, he predicted that
courts would soon find nonreporting employ-
ees to be reasonable. While we were unsure
about Joe’s predictions, we thought repeating
the study was an excellent idea.
We began updating the study in summer
2006, five years after the first study, as sug-
gested by Baumgarten. By this point, of
course, the case law had expanded. Instead
of 72 cases, we now had more than 500
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cases to code and analyze. In our prelimi-
nary 2006 study, we analyzed a total of 133
cases. These 133 cases consisted of all of
the circuit cases since June 1998, along with
the most recent district court cases where an
employer sought summary judgment based
on the Ellerth/Faragher defense. At the
recently conducted 2007 roundtable, we
presented the extremely preliminary results
from these 133 cases. Analysis of these
cases revealed, to the surprise of many, little
change to the 2001 data. Courts still do not
require employers to have anything more
than a “good policy,” employees who do not
report are almost always considered unrea-
sonable, and employees who do report will
often be found to be reasonable if the
employer responded well. Put simply, an
employer will prevail if it has a “good pol-
icy” and either (1) the employee does not
report or (2) the employer responds well to
the complaint. There is no need to train or
have a toll-free number. Employers must,
however, respond well.
Exhibit 1 sets forth our preliminary
results. First, as it relates to an employer’s
satisfaction of the first prong, second
prong, and prevailing in a summary judg-
ment motion, two variables—one involving
the employer and the other the employee—
appear salient. Good things happen to
employers that respond well. Conversely,
bad things happen to employees who fail to
report the alleged harassment. Second, our
admittedly preliminary results largely con-
firm findings from our initial study.
Once again, the 2007 roundtable par-
ticipants agreed with the conclusions but
provided a different take on the way this
information should be considered by
employers.
Roundtable participants explained that
while summary judgment motions are impor-
tant, they are not the end that drives the
case. The vast majority of sexual harassment
cases settle before the case ever reaches 
a judge or a summary judgment. Thus,
employers’ and plaintiffs’ lawyers are always
positioning themselves for settlement dis-
cussions. In these discussions, the manage-
ment’s lawyer will contend that the case
will never survive summary judgment.
Contesting that argument, the plaintiff’s
lawyer will then argue that if this case gets to
a jury the plaintiff will receive a windfall.
This argument is the key element, because,
as the management lawyers at the table
argued, when you get in front of a jury you
want to show that you did everything you
could do to prevent or remedy harassment.
Training, 800 numbers, and strong investiga-
tions are what juries want to see. In fact, as
these trial lawyers explained, juries and
judges often act similarly by rendering
“result-orientated holdings.”
“Result-oriented holdings” is a term
used by lawyers to describe situations
where the judge or jury first decides who
should win and then “makes the law” fit
that desired result. Our 2001 study pro-
vided a number of examples where judges
seemingly engaged in such a process.
Specifically, we found that judges “made”
employees sound unreasonable even when
they reported. For example, under literal
reading of the Ellerth defense, it would
seem that an employer cannot possibly
prevail on a summary judgment motion in
a case in which the employee reported the
alleged harassment because it would seem
that an employee who reported harassment
cannot have unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer.
Indeed, a few courts did mechanically
apply the defense by denying summary
judgment to defendant-employers even
when the employers did all that they could
have done to prevent and correct harass-
ment. For example, in Moore v. Sam’s
Club, the plaintiff alleged that the coman-
ager of the store harassed and then raped
her.4 As related in the case documents, the
conduct occurred either in late March or
56 Cornell Hospitality Quarterly FEBRUARY 2008
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4. 55 F. Supp. 2d 177 (1999).
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early April, and the plaintiff complained
on April 25. On May 1, the employer
asked the plaintiff to provide a detailed
statement. The company then investigated
and suspended the harasser on May 3. 
The suspension ended on June 15, and the
company then demoted and transferred the
harasser. The plaintiff then requested a
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Exhibit 1:
(Preliminary) Outcomes of Sexual Harassment Complaints (Ordinary Least
Squares)
Employer Employer Employer 
Satisfied Satisfied Summary 
Prong One Prong Two Judgment
Employer:
Had a policy 3.743 1.430 —
(1.31) (1.65) —
Disseminated policy –0.177 0.555 0.306
(0.17) (0.66) (0.30)
Offered alternative ways to report 0.377 –0.097 0.177
(0.46) (0.19) (0.27)
Had a good policy 0.994 –0.091 0.509
(1.64) (0.15) (0.78)
Had training program 1.090 1.047 0.672
(1.05) (1.17) (0.75)
Had an 800 emergency report number 0.778 1.392 0.713
(1.06) (1.35) (0.87)
Exerted additional effort 1.280 –0.323 –0.941
(1.15) (0.27) (0.77)
Responded well 3.047 2.668 3.215
(4.09)* (4.14)* (5.05)*
Employee:
Failed to report 3.440 3.811 3.398
(2.76)* (4.56)* (4.13)*
Failed to timely report –0.331 –0.822 –0.417
(0.31) (1.09) (0.46)
Reported well –0.357 –0.353 0.120
(0.38) (0.28) (0.14)
Court:
Circuit case 1.279 0.436 0.501
(1.62) (1.00) (0.89)
Analyzed employee’s report 0.120 –1.112 –1.233
(0.18) (1.59) (1.54)
Analyzed employer’s response 0.308 0.547 0.173
(0.40) (1.06) (0.33)
Constant –6.648 –3.548 –2.048
(2.95)* (2.89)* (1.81)
N 133 133 123
Note: Cases are clustered at circuit court level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*p < .01.
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transfer from New York to Florida, and the
company consented. The plaintiff moved
to Florida but did not report to work,
choosing instead at this point to sue.
In addressing the summary judgment
motion, the court first held that Sam’s
Club had exercised reasonable care both in
formulating its policy and in responding to
the complaint. The court then held, how-
ever, that Sam’s Club could not prevail on
the second prong of the defense because
the plaintiff took full advantage of the pre-
ventative measures provided, and there-
fore had not acted unreasonably. Thus,
Sam’s Club did everything it could have
done, but lost because the plaintiff also
had acted appropriately.5
Whether this is a just ruling is a matter
of opinion. What is clear, however, is that
(1) it is the proper application of the
defense and (2) it is not the way the major-
ity of courts have ruled in such cases.
In both of our studies, we found that the
most courts interpreting the affirmative
defense have refused to hold employers who
responded properly to complaints of sexual
harassment liable for the actions of their
supervisors. Instead, most courts rewarded
employers for doing what they should to pre-
vent and correct harassment. These courts
based their holdings solely on whether the
employer fortuitously employed someone
who failed to act reasonably by not report-
ing. Thus, judges drafted result-oriented
opinions in which they had to comport their
conclusions, which were based exclusively
on the employer’s actions (i.e., prevention
and response to harassment), with the lan-
guage of Ellerth and Faragher. Doing just
that, these courts justified this seemingly
anomalous result in one of two ways. Some
courts created new law, while others judged
the report to “find” a rationale for making
the employee unreasonable.
A prime example of a court creating
new law is found in Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., where the Fifth Circuit
held that the Ellerth/Faragher defense is
does not apply when an employee follows
an employer’s policies.6 Instead, the court
created what essentially amounts to a new
defense for employers: employers who
swiftly respond to complaints of sexual
harassment are not liable for the actions of
their supervisors. Applying this standard,
the court held that
because she promptly complained of
Arnaudet’s harassing conduct, and because
the company promptly responded, disci-
plined Arnaudet appropriately and stopped
the harassment, the district court properly
granted judgment as a matter of law to
Freeman. Even if a hostile work environ-
ment claim had been stated, which is
dubious, Freeman’s prompt remedial
response relieves it of Title VII vicarious
liability.7
Hence, in the Fifth Circuit, an employer who
exercises reasonable care in responding to a
complaint of sexual harassment will be able
to prevail on the affirmative defense and
avoid liability even if the conduct was severe
or pervasive. It seems that the Indest court
was loath to rule against “good actor”
employers, and so it distinguished the case
from Ellerth and Faragher. While this may
be problematic to some, it is not nearly as
58 Cornell Hospitality Quarterly FEBRUARY 2008
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5. The court noted that the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense “does not apply here.” Id. at 192.
The court also noted that “it is thus unclear how the [Ellerth]/Faragher defense, on its own terms, would
apply here” because the factual scenario of those cases are distinct from those in Moore. Id. at 193. The
court may have been penalizing Sam’s Club because of the relatively minor punishment that the company
meted out to a supervisor who raped an employee. If so, the case is even more problematic because other
courts could follow the stated rationale—that employers cannot prevail when the employee reports—even
when the employer provided the utmost care and gave out appropriate discipline.
6. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
7. Id. at 267.
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objectionable as basing a liability decision
on an analysis of the employee’s report.
Unfortunately, most courts presiding over
cases in which the employee reported harass-
ment and the employer responded properly
have granted the employer’s motion for sum-
mary judgment by evaluating the plaintiff’s
report and concluding it to be untimely or
otherwise defective.8
In numerous cases from the both the orig-
inal and current samples, courts found plain-
tiffs to have acted unreasonably because they
delayed reporting the harassment.9 In some
cases, there was a delay of one year or more
between the first harassing action and the
report.10 In other cases, however, the delay
was a matter of months or even weeks. For
example, in Nuris Guerra v. Editorial
Televisa-USA, Inc., the plaintiff, who began
working on May 28, 1996, was harassed
every day from her first week of work until
she complained on June 20, 1996.11 In dis-
missing the case, the court held that the delay,
combined with the employer’s prompt and
proper response, satisfied the second prong
of the defense. Similarly, in Mirakhorli v.
DFW Management Co., it was unclear
whether the harassment began two months
or eight months before the plaintiff com-
plained.12 The court was unconcerned with
the discrepancy because it found a delay of
either two or eight months to be unreason-
able as a matter of law. Finally, in Dedner v.
Oklahoma, the plaintiff waited three months
to report the harassment because she did not
think the employer’s procedures would be
effective and because she thought the super-
visor would stop the harassing behavior.
Again, the court found the delay unreason-
able and granted summary judgment. 13
Delay is not the only rationale that courts
use for finding that employees who reported
harassment nonetheless acted unreasonably.
Several decisions hold that reporting to the
wrong party constitutes an unreasonable fail-
ure to take advantage of the employer’s poli-
cies and procedures. In DeCesare v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp., the plaintiff com-
plained by mentioning the sexual harassment
to her union representative instead of using
the company’s procedures. The court found
this to be unreasonable.14 In Masson v. School
Board, an employee filed multiple complaints
to people who were not designated to hear
sexual harassment complaints.15 Moreover,
she complained of being replaced, not sexu-
ally harassed. The court dismissed the case.
Judging the reasonableness of a com-
plainant’s actions creates numerous prob-
lems. In certain circumstances, it makes little
sense to hold that an employee’s waiting
several months to report harassment is
unreasonable. Pursuing a sexual harassment
complaint can be difficult. Regardless of the
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8. Reports are considered defective because they are either untimely or reported to the wrong party. A defec-
tive report, according to numerous courts, indicates an unreasonable employee response. See infra notes
145, 146, and 149.
9. It must be noted that in each of these cases the employer responded with reasonable care according to the
court.
10. See, e.g., Hetreed, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7219, at *3.
11. No. 97-3670-CIV-UNGARO-BENAGES, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10082 (S.D. Fla. June 2, 1999).
12. No. 3:94-CV-1464-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 1999).
13. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (E.D. Okla. 1999). While a delay may be unreasonable as a matter of law to some
courts, others have denied summary judgment motions so that a jury could decide if the plaintiffs’ delays
were reasonable. See Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, at 507-08 & n.1, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that
reasonableness of plaintiff’s one-and-a-half month delay was a question for the jury); Fall v. Indiana Univ.
Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 884 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (noting plaintiff’s three month delay).
14. No. 98-3851, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7560 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 1999).
15. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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company’s procedures, employees may
wonder whether they are being overly sensi-
tive by misinterpreting innocent banter, or
whether they can resolve the issue without
the angst and difficulty associated with pur-
suing a formal complaint. While it makes
sense to encourage early complaints of
harassment that may squelch the harassment
before it blooms to an unlawful level, such
reporting of claims should not be required
for a plaintiff’s case to survive summary
judgment. Employees should not have to
endure the stress of what results in, for all
intents and purposes, a two-month statute of
limitations on harassment.
While “judging the report” may seem to
have little or no negative connotations for
employers, it is not the panacea it seems.
Some courts have found that the question of
whether a report is defective to be a question
for a jury. When such cases survive sum-
mary judgment employers must either settle
or face a jury. Employers believe and fear
that juries will also provide result-oriented
holdings. Unfortunately, because jury deci-
sions are not written, there is little solid data
to support this conclusion. Anecdotal evi-
dence, however, strongly supports the con-
clusion that juries do, in fact, ignore the law
and focus on “justice.” The problem for
employers is that juries’ theory of justice
may differ from that of the majorities of
courts. Juries, most employers fear, will
find for a plaintiff who has suffered sex-
ual harassment regardless of whether an
employer has acted properly to prevent and
correct harassment. Thus, an employer who
fails to prevail at summary judgment may
lose at trial even if it had a good policy and
responded well. While this theory has not
been (and likely cannot be) tested, it drives
management lawyers to the following con-
clusion: employers should do everything in
their power to prevent harassment. While
offering training and toll-free reporting lines
may lead to more complaints, most courts
will not find against an employer who
responded well, and juries will only find for
employers only if they have done all they
could to prevent and correct harassment.
Thus, the roundtable participants agreed
that the cost of increased claims and the
small chance of losing even in the face of
good response are outweighed by fact that
extra prevention will reduce the likelihood
of a jury finding for the plaintiff. The other
benefit to the training and other extra mea-
sures stems from the main point of all of this
law, that is, ridding the organization of sex-
ual harassment.
Preventing harassment in the first place
benefits all involved. Our “in-house” lawyers
and other company executives argued that
their goal was not to win cases but to create
an atmosphere where employees knew
that harassment was not tolerated and that
harassers would be identified and either
punished or terminated. These participants
explained that their goals were to create a
culture of respect, so that employees trusted
the company. In this light, increased com-
plaints were seen as a positive development,
because it allowed the company to address
problems, while at the same time, those
complaints need not lead to lawsuits when
addressed well.
Conclusion
Our preliminary study showed that
employers who have a policy to prevent sex-
ual harassment will prevail in summary
judgment motions if either (1) the employee
does not report or (2) the employer responded
well. There remains no need for training or a
toll-free report line. However, when the case
goes to a jury, the situation is different. Our
2007 roundtable participants reported that
they prevailed in jury trials because they
had training and toll-free reporting lines.
Consequently, they advise their clients that
these extra measures not only are favorable
for juries, but they are the best way to rid the
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organization of harassment, will help the
employer in settlement negotiations, will be
vital at trial, and will have a minimal if any
negative effect at summary judgment. Thus,
the inescapable conclusion is that employers
should do all they can to prevent harassment.
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